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 Detecting and recollecting change can counteract proactive interference, and, in 
some cases, lead to proactive facilitation. The Memory-for-Change account assumes that 
attention is involved in detecting change, but that has not been directly tested. The current 
study is the first to investigate the role of attention in change detection and its 
consequences for change recollection. Participants studied a list of word pairs comprised 
of four seamless blocks. In each block there were three sets of word pairs: one set 
repeated across all four blocks (A-B, A-B), one set repeated in the first three blocks and 
then had the same cue with a changed response in the fourth block (A-B, A-D), and one 
set was unique to each block (C-D). Attention during encoding was measured using a 
probe-caught procedure. Thought probes asking participants to indicate whether they 
were “on-task” or “off-task” appeared throughout the study phase. Participants then 
completed a cued recall test for responses from the fourth block. Participants were also 
asked to indicate if each pair changed during the study phase, and to report the earlier 
response if there was a change. Results showed that recollecting change was associated 
with higher memory accuracy at test compared to when change was not recollected. In 
both between and within subject analyses, “on-task” reports were associated with higher 
memory accuracy and change recollection compared to “off-task” reports. These findings 
implicate a critical role for attention in change detection and recollection, and recall 
performance under conditions that could lead to proactive interference.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 In our daily lives, we sometimes experience moments of inattention, where our 
focus drifts from the current task we are completing to our own internal thoughts. In 
many routine activities, there are typically minor, if any, consequences associated with 
this lapse in attention because you can complete the activity automatically. However, the 
consequences to these attentional lapses are greater for novel activities that require new 
learning. This may be especially important under conditions that can lead to interference 
in memory. Imagine that you have been told about the positive side effects of a drug on 
several occasions. Later on, information is presented to you about how the drug poses 
significant negative side effects, but you were thinking about something else when you 
were given this information. Since you were not fully attending to the negative side 
effects of the drug, you may fail to accurately represent its side effects. Then, when 
someone asks your opinion on the drug, you experience interference for the most recent 
information on the side effects of the drug, but decide to suggest the drug to them 
anyway. This inability to process the change and update your memory representation for 
the side effects of the drug could have negative consequences for the person to whom you 
recommended it. As outlined below, one way to avoid these negative consequences is to 
detect and recollect the change that occurred, but this might require that you paid 
attention to that changed information.
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 The goal of the current experiment was to investigate the consequences of natural 
fluctuations in attention on the ability to recall recent information when that information 
changed from an earlier episode. More specifically, the current study examined how 
attention to changes influenced the likelihood that people could later recollect such 
changes, along with how that would have an associated effect on memory for recent 
information. To accomplish this, I used a probe-caught mind wandering technique to 
capture fluctuations in attention during study in a variant of an A-B, A-D paradigm. This 
allowed me to observe the downstream consequences associated with fluctuations in 
attention on the ability to later recollect changes and recall recent information. By 
examining the role of attention in change processing during study, the current experiment 
will further our understanding of the factors that influence memory performance under 
conditions that can lead to proactive interference. 
Memory-for-Change Account 
As in the drug example above, interference is likely to occur when two stimuli 
have shared overlapping features. Traditionally, interference has been induced using the 
A-B, A-D paired associate learning paradigm, where participants are asked to study two 
lists of word pairs and are later tested on only one of the lists (for a review, see Anderson 
& Neely, 1996). The lists typically contain a mixture of word pairs that either repeat 
across lists (A-B, A-B), are only on one study list (C-D) or have the same cue with two 
different responses on each list (e.g., pearl-harbor; pearl-jewelry; A-B, A-D). 
Competition arises for A-B, A-D items because the two responses share the same 
retrieval cue (e.g., Postman & Underwood, 1973). Proactive interference is shown by 
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lower correct recall of A-B, A-D items relative to C-D items, and a tendency to produce 
A-B intrusions at a rate above baseline when asked to recall A-D. 
Although it is typical to observe proactive interference in such paradigms, there 
are several ways in which one can avoid such interference. Most often, interference can 
be counteracted by using a method to differentiate the lists from each other in order to 
reduce the competition between responses (for a discussion on list differentiation, see 
Postman & Underwood, 1973). Factors such as other effective cues about list 
membership or shorter retention intervals can allow one to resolve the interference that 
would occur from the overlap in retrieval cues by knowing the list membership of the 
responses. More recently, it has been suggested that the integration of responses can also 
serve to reduce interference that can occur in A-B, A-D paired associate learning 
paradigms. The Memory-for-Change account (e.g., Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Kelley, 2015; 
Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013; MFC) posits that whether interference or facilitation is 
observed for A-B, A-D items depends on how often participants engage in change 
detection and recollection. Building on Hintzman’s (2004, 2010, 2011) recursive 
reminding hypothesis, the MFC account proposes that a reminding can be triggered when 
two stimuli have an overlap in features, such as the same retrieval cue. This reminding 
can lead to change detection and allow for the representation of the previous stimulus to 
be embedded with a representation of the current stimulus. This configural representation 
is assumed to preserve the temporal order of the stimuli, since it can be inferred at 
retrieval that the stimulus that triggered the reminding had to occur more recently than 
the stimulus that was the object of the reminding. Furthermore, this configural
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representation provides a route to establish the list membership of responses (Jacoby, 
Wahlheim, & Yonelinas, 2013). Bringing the configural representation to mind later on 
allows one access to both stimuli and the temporal order in which they occurred, thereby 
providing a memorial benefit. This recollective process, coined change recollection, can 
be measured by asking participants at test if any other words came to mind when 
recalling the recent response (Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013; Wahlheim, 2014) or by having 
participants explicitly indicate if they remembered a change (Jacoby et al., 2013; Negley, 
Kelley, & Jacoby, 2018; Wahlheim & Zacks, 2019; Wahlheim, 2015). 
Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) provided support for the MFC account in a series of 
studies using a variant of the A-B, A-D paired associate learning paradigms as described 
above. Participants completed a cued recall test for List 2 that included a change 
recollection measure. The results across the three experiments converged, showing that 
correct recall of List 2 responses was higher when change was recollected than when it 
was not. Critically, Experiment 1 showed that counteracting proactive interference was 
dependent on the ability to recollect change at test after it had been detected in List 2. The 
MFC account proposes that change detection involves the retrieval of the List 1 response 
during encoding of List 2, and without remembering that this change occurred, one may 
incorrectly report the List 1 response as the most recent at test. This intrusion occurs 
because retrieval practice of the List 1 response leads to it being highly accessible and 
therefore, mistaken as more recent. However, the high accessibility of List 1 can be offset 
with change recollection at test because this retrieval process provides access to the 
configural representation that includes both responses and their temporal relationship.
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These studies provided evidence for the prediction from the MFC account that 
performance on A-B, A-D items is a combination of both proactive interference and 
proactive facilitation. Proactive facilitation emerged for items when change was 
recollected, and proactive interference occurred for items when change was not 
recollected. 
Further work in this line has identified several factors that influence how often 
participants engage in change detection and recollection. These include: semantic 
associations (Wahlheim, 2014), age (Wahlheim & Zacks, 2019; Wahlheim, 2014), task 
instructions (Jacoby et al., 2015), interpolated testing (Wahlheim, 2015), List 1 
repetitions (Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013, Experiment 1; Wahlheim 2014, Experiment 2) 
and study time (Negley et al., 2018). Most relevant to the current study, Jacoby et al. 
(2015) showed that using instructions to manipulate attention towards changes during 
List 2 had a causal influence on the rate of change detection. Their experiments employed 
a variant of the A-B, A-D paradigm that included pairs that changed between List 1 and 
List 2, and also within List 2. Participants in the N-back group were told to indicate 
changes that occurred anywhere in the experiment (between List 1 and List 2 and within 
List 2) while participants in the Within-list back group were told to indicate only changes 
that occurred within List 2. This looking-back manipulation of controlled attention was 
successful because those in the N-back group detected more changes between List 1 and 
List 2 than those in the Within-list back group. Furthermore, those in the N-back group 
experienced proactive facilitation on the final test for between-list changed pairs, as recall
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performance for List 2 responses was higher on those items than on control items, while 
those in the Within-back group did not show this effect (Experiments 2 & 3).  
By instructing participants on where to look for changes, the experimenters 
influenced how often people attended to changes that occurred between lists, and in turn, 
influenced later recall performance. This suggests that people can be guided in how often 
they look back to prior episodes. However, there are likely to be both inter- and intra- 
individual differences in the extent to which people direct their attention to previous 
episodes without instruction to do so. Rather than focusing on exogenous factors that can 
be manipulated or controlled, the current experiment will be the first to directly examine 
how natural fluctuations in attention during encoding influence the change detection and 
recollection processes proposed by the MFC account. Based on the results of Jacoby et al. 
(2015), I expected that when participants in the current experiment are attending to 
changed pairs during study, they will be more likely to detect change and recollect them. 
However, when their attention is focused on something other than the changed pairs 
during study, they will be less likely to detect change and recollect the changed pairs. 
Measuring Attention Fluctuation through Mind Wandering Episodes 
The general tenets of the MFC account have been supported by the work 
reviewed in the previous section. However, the assumption that natural variations in 
attention to changes can influence change processing has not been directly examined yet. 
To test this assumption, I applied a technique used to study more specific lapses in 
attention: mind wandering. Mind wandering, also known as task unrelated thoughts 
(Giambra, 1989) or stimulus independent thoughts (Antrobus, Singer & Greenberg, 
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1966), occurs when a person’s thoughts move off from the current task to their own 
internal state (for a review, see Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Based on studies using 
experience sampling, mind wandering has been estimated to occur between 30% (Kane et 
al., 2007) and 50% (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) of the time during an average day. To 
capture these mind wandering episodes as they occur, researchers must rely on the ability 
of participants to report their own thought content or level of attention.  
One laboratory-based method for measuring these episodes is the self-caught 
method, which requires participants to make a response if, or when, they become aware 
that they are mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Due to the somewhat 
spontaneous nature of mind wandering (e.g., Smallwood, 2013), and the fact that mind 
wandering episodes may not always reach conscious awareness (e.g., Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015), researchers have also employed the probe-caught method (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006). This involves spontaneously inserting probes during a task to ask people 
to categorize their thoughts just before that probe appeared. These probes can vary in 
form, such as giving a simple dichotomous on-task or off-task choice, as is used in the 
current study, or providing categorical options about what participants were thinking 
about (e.g., Kane et al., 2007; Kane et al., 2017). There is some inconsistency on the 
specifics of the probe design (for a recent discussion, see Weinstein, 2018), but unlike the 
self-caught method, the probe caught method does not require that participants make a 
response when they become aware of their own mind wandering. 
Using these methods, researchers have gained valuable insight into the correlates 
of mind wandering. In the laboratory and in everyday life, individual differences in 
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executive control abilities and working memory capacity have been shown to 
significantly predict the frequency of mind wandering (e.g., Kane et al., 2007; Kane & 
McVay, 2012; Kane et al., 2016; McVay & Kane, 2009). In addition, some external 
variables, such as the type of task being performed, can also influence how likely one is 
to mind wander (e.g., Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Mind wandering typically occurs 
more often in less demanding tasks (e.g., Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009) and 
increases with the time on the task (e.g., Metcalfe & Xu, 2016; McVay & Kane, 2012;  
Teasdale, 1995, Experiment 3; Thomson, Seli, Besner & Smilek, 2014). It may be best to 
characterize the frequency of mind wandering as dependent on the interaction of internal 
and external factors. Mind wandering episodes occur when executive control fails to 
maintain focus in the face of internal thoughts that are often spurred by the environment 
(e.g., Kane & McVay, 2012; McVay & Kane, 2009, 2010).  
Mind Wandering and Memory 
It has been argued that the route through which mind wandering has its negative 
effects on memory is primarily through encoding (e.g., Thomson, Smilek, & Besner, 
2014). As posited by the decoupling hypothesis of mind wandering, when one has a mind 
wandering episode, the focus of attention goes from taking in sensory input from the 
external environment to input from one’s internal thoughts and feelings. This is then 
associated with a decrease in sensitivity to further sensory input coming from the external 
environment, and therefore, poorer encoding of task demands (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006; Smallwood, 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Researchers have found 
suggestive evidence that mind wandering may result in disruptions in encoding that can 
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lead to more familiarity-based retrieval than a full recollective process (e.g., Smallwood, 
Riby, Heim & Davies, 2006; Riby, Smallwood & Gunn, 2008; Smallwood, Baracaia, 
Lowe & Obonsawin, 2003). When the mind wanders, it becomes more difficult to pay 
attention to the task at hand, and the consequences to that lapse in attention may be more 
magnified in situations where elaborative encoding and retrieval is involved. 
Evidence for the detrimental effects of mind wandering when elaborative 
encoding is necessary has been shown by researchers studying the consequences of mind 
wandering on different levels of processing (e.g., Maillet & Rajah, 2013). In this study, 
the level of processing was manipulated within subjects, where participants were asked to 
make shallow encoding judgements for half of the experiment, and deep encoding 
judgements for the other half. The results showed that mind wandering predicted 
recognition memory performance, such that higher rates of mind wandering led to lower 
performance, but only for the deep encoding condition. One limitation of the study was 
that mind wandering was only assessed at the end of each encoding block. This could 
lead to imprecision in measuring the frequency of mind wandering since was not an 
“online” measure and instead required participants to rely on their memory of their 
internal thoughts from the prior encoding phase.  
Improving on this limitation, Thomson et al. (2014) conducted a similar study that 
implemented thought probes throughout the encoding phase while participants made deep 
or shallow encoding judgements. In their study, when participants were in the deep 
encoding condition, they had to indicate if the size of the object the word represented was 
bigger than a computer monitor or not. When in the shallow encoding condition, they had 
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to indicate if the word was presented in uppercase or not. The results converged with 
earlier work, showing there was a significant negative correlation between mind 
wandering and recognition memory performance in the deep encoding task only. 
Interestingly, there was no relationship between mind wandering and task performance 
after controlling for how accurately participants made the size judgement. This led the 
authors to argue that mind wandering disrupted the subjects’ ability to make a correct 
encoding judgment, and therefore, reduced the effectiveness of the deep encoding 
manipulation, and subsequently, memory performance. 
In addition to studies on the level of processing that participants engage in during 
study, mind wandering has been found to disrupt the ability of participants to infer or 
induce information that is necessary for completion of a task. In one such study, 
participants were asked to study paintings made by famous artists, and then were tested 
on the ability to induce which previously studied artist had completed new paintings. The 
results showed that mind wandering negatively predicted inductive abilities (Metcalfe & 
Xu, 2016). Furthermore, mind wandering has also been shown to reduce the ability for 
one to update a situation model, which had later consequences for comprehension of the 
associated narrative (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008). The authors of this 
study reasoned that mind wandering during critical points in the narrative prevented 
participants from retrieving vital information that would have helped them integrate 
information in order to make correct inferences. Finally, mind wandering has also been 
shown to reduce student learning outcomes in both classroom (Risko, Anderson, Sarwal, 
Engelhardt & Kingstone, 2012; Wammes, Seli, Cheyne, Boucher & Smilek, 2016) and 
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laboratory settings (Farley, Risko, & Kingstone, 2013; Kane et al., 2017; Loh, Tan, & 
Lim, 2016; Risko, Buchanan, Medimorec & Kingstone, 2013). Greater mind wandering 
during the video lecture was associated with poorer learning of the lecture material, 
presumably because the ability to integrate and retrieve knowledge was reduced when 
attention was not focused on the lecture.  
Across these different contexts in which mind wandering impaired memory, there 
is evidence to suggest that mind wandering impacts the ability of one to encode the 
information necessary to perform well on the memory test. In particular, mind wandering 
was detrimental when the encoding was more elaborative in nature, such as during deep 
encoding or when integrating information to update a situation model. As described 
earlier, the process of change detection and recollection also requires elaborate 
integration in order to form a configural representation that can then be recollected at test. 
In accordance with the work by Smallwood, McSpadden, and Schooler (2008), it is 
expected that when participants in the current study are mind wandering when studying a 
changed pair, they will be less likely to be reminded of the earlier response, which will 
have downstream consequences for later memory for changes. 
The Present Study  
Based on previous studies, lapses in attention that are associated with mind 
wandering appear to play a critical role in memory, particularly through the encoding of 
information. Given that the MFC account outlines one way in which interference can be 
avoided, it is necessary to directly examine how attention influences the processes 
outlined by the MFC account. Attention is posited to play a role in the various processes 
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outlined by the MFC account. First, the subjective experience of studying a changed 
word pair is akin to a recognition memory test or a categorization judgement where 
participants must decide if the word pair they are studying is the same as it was before, or 
if it has changed. If they have not given enough attention to effectively encode the 
original pair, this may lead them to experience the changed word pair as brand new. This 
could lead to memory performance on that pair to be similar to that of a control item, 
eliminating the potential for facilitation that occurs from detecting and recollecting 
change. Second, even if one has encoded the original presentation of the word pair, 
attention must also be given to the changed word pair when it is presented. Without 
attending to the changed word pair, the reminding that enables the formation of a 
configural memory representation containing both pairs will not occur. Bringing both 
stimuli into one configural representation creates the potential to access it later and to 
improve memory for the changed pair. Without this, one could experience a memory 
error whereby the original word pair is thought to be more recent because the changed 
word pair was encoded poorly. Change detection is a necessary first step in the process, 
as recall performance does not differ based on whether change recollected or not if 
change is not originally detected (Wahlheim & Zacks, 2019). Although the current study 
does not employ a measure of attention at retrieval, it is assumed that attention is also 
necessary for change recollection to occur at test. 
Goals and Hypotheses 
The main goal of the current experiment was to investigate these hypothesized 
downstream effects of attentional fluctuation on change detection, change recollection, 
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and associated recall performance by examining both inter- and intra- individual 
differences in self-reported attention during encoding. To accomplish this goal, I 
designed a variant of an A-B, A-D paradigm that included thought probes during the 
study phase to examine how attention during encoding influences later memory. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to use the thought probe method in a paradigm designed 
to induce proactive interference. Consequently, the present experiment is the first to 
characterize the consequences of variations in attention for memory under conditions that 
could lead to proactive interference. In the present experiment, the study phase contained 
seamless blocks in which items either repeated across blocks (A-B, A-B), were unique to 
each block (C-D), or had the same cue from earlier blocks paired with a different 
response in the last block of the study phase (A-B, A-D). During study, participants were 
periodically asked to report if they were “on-task” or “off-task”. After completing the 
study phase, participants were tested on all responses that appeared in the last block, and 
were asked to indicate change and recall the earlier response if there was a change (i.e., 
the change recollection measure). I did not include an explicit change detection measure 
during study to minimize the exogenous influences on attention. However, I am still able 
to infer differences in change detection rates during study from the change recollection 
measure at test. This assumption is based on findings from prior research showing that 
manipulations that influence change detection also have similar influences on change 
recollection at test. For example, in a retroactive effects of memory study, Negley et al., 
(2018) found that longer study time for competing information increased the rate of 
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change detection, and there was also an associated increase in change recollection for 
those items. 
During the study phase, I expected that the proportion of “on-task” reports would 
decrease across blocks of the study phase because mind wandering typically increases as 
the duration of the task increases (e.g., Metcalfe & Xu, 2016; Teasdale, 1995, Experiment 
3; Thomson, Seli, Besner & Smilek, 2014). During the test phase, I expected that overall 
recall performance would be highest for A-B, A-B items, and, consistent with the MFC 
account, performance for recall of the most recent response for A-B, A-D items would 
reflect both proactive facilitation and proactive interference. The balance of these effects 
was expected to depend on how often participants recollected change. I expected 
proactive interference, where recall for the recent response of A-B, A-D items is lower 
than recall for C-D items, when participants did not recollect change and proactive 
facilitation, where recall for the recent response of A-B, A-D items is higher than recall 
for C-D items, when participants did recollect change (e.g., Wahlheim, 2015). I also 
expected that participants would report the highest rate of intrusions for the A-B, A-D 
items as compared to the other two item types (for which intrusions represent a baseline 
of how likely participants are able to guess what the response would have changed from 
if it had been an A-B, A-D item). 
Importantly, I expected positive association between attention to the task and later 
recall, such that participants with a greater proportion of “on-task” reports would have 
higher recall than participants with a greater proportion of “off-task” reports. 
Furthermore, I expected that within participants, when an “on-task” report was given, 
15 
 
 
recall performance would be higher than when an “off-task” report was given. This 
difference in performance should be larger for recall of A-B, A-D items than A-B, A-B 
items, since the former requires encoding of both the original and the changed response 
while the latter provides more chances for effective encoding due to repeated 
presentations. I also expected higher rates of intrusions for A-B, A-D items when an “off-
task” report was given compared to an “on-task” report because participants had more 
opportunities to encode the A-B, A-B item throughout the study blocks and only one 
opportunity to encode the A-B, A-D item. Therefore, the A-B, A-B item should have a 
higher probability of being reported if participants were “off-task” during the last block 
of the study phase. Regarding change classifications made at test, I expected that when 
participants gave an “on-task” report, they would have higher change classifications than 
when they report “off-task”. Being off-task means that attention was shifted away from 
encoding that item, making it less likely that participants would detect the change and 
report it as changed later at test. 
In addition to the hypotheses regarding the relationship between attention and 
memory, I also explored whether the rate at which participants were on-task in the 
current experiment would relate to how often they make inattention errors in everyday 
life. To do so, I made a computerized version of the Revised Attention Related Cognitive 
Errors Scale (ARCES; Carriere, Cheyne & Smilek, 2008). The measure contains 12 
statements about errors in everyday life that stem from a lapse in attention. As an 
example, the second question on the measure states “I go into a room to do one thing 
(e.g., brush my teeth) and end up doing something else (e.g., brush my hair), and 
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participants are asked to indicate how often this happens for them on a scale from 1 
(never) to 5 (very often). This scale has been shown to significantly correlate with other 
measures of a general propensity have attention lapses and has been validated in a large 
college sample (Carriere et al., 2008; Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006). I expected that 
there would be a negative relationship between attention to the task and the ARCES 
measure, indicating that more “on-task” reports were associated with a lower frequency 
of attention related errors in everyday life.
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
In what follows, I report how I determined sample size, all data exclusions, all 
manipulations, and all measures in this study (Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn, 2012). 
Data files and analysis scripts can be found here: https://osf.io/56t9k/. 
Participants 
 My final sample consisted of 132 younger adults (95 female), ages 18-29 (M = 
19.02, SD = 1.70), who were recruited through an online participant pool for 
undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG). The sample 
had an average of 12.77 years of education (range = 12-16, SD = 1.19). The sample 
composition was as follows: 44% identified as African American (59), 40% Caucasian 
(53), 5% Hispanic or Latino (7), 5% as more than one race (7), and 3% Asian or Pacific 
Islander (4). I determined the sample size for the experiment based on the number of 
participants needed to examine the interaction within-subjects between task reports and 
item type for recall performance, which was the main interest for the study. Prior work 
manipulating external variables to influence change recollection and recall performance 
have found small to medium sized effects ranging from ηp
2 = .06 - .09 (Negley et al., 
2018; Wahlheim, 2015). According to G*Power Version 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009), a total sample size of 128 is sufficient to detect a small to 
medium effect (ηp
2 = .06, which translates to Cohen’s f = .25), at power = .80 and α = .05
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(two-tailed). With this sample size, the study is also powered at 80% to detect a between-
subjects correlation of r = .25. Given that the current study requires 12 formats to 
complete the counterbalance (described in the next section), I collected data from 132 
participants to allow each format of the experiment to appear equally often across 
participants. Participants received partial course credit as compensation. Two participants 
were replaced, one due to an interruption from a fire drill, and one for falling asleep 
during the session (total of 134 participants tested). 
Design and Materials 
 This experiment employed a within-subjects design, with the primary independent 
variable being Item Type (A-B, A-B vs. C-D vs. A-B, A-D). The materials consisted of 
156 word sets (144 critical and 12 buffers) taken mostly from Jacoby (1996). The design 
of the study required more word sets than were available from the original study, so sets 
from the Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998) free association norms were also 
included. Each set contained a cue (e.g., knee) and two responses (e.g., bone, bend). The 
two responses could complete the same word fragment because they have an 
orthographic relationship (e.g., knee-b_n_), but the fragments were not used here. For 
counterbalancing, the critical word sets were divided into 6 groups of 24. Each group 
appeared as each item type equally often across participants. For the first 6 formats, the 
response arbitrarily labeled as Response 1 (e.g., bone) was the target word while the 
response labeled as Response 2 (e.g., bend) was the target word for the other 6 formats. 
The average lengths of cues (M = 5.26, SD = 1.60, range 2-9 characters) and responses 
(M = 4.76, SD = 1.08, range 3-8 characters) were matched across groups. The frequency 
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of responses was assessed according to hyperspace analog to language (HAL), which is 
used as a representational model of semantic memory (Lund & Burgess, 1996) and was 
catalogued by the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007). The average frequency 
was matched across groups for the cues (M = 9.44, SD = 1.45, range = 6-14) and the 
responses (M = 9.34, SD = 1.60, range = 5-14). Associations between cues and targets, 
indexed by Nelson, McEvoy and Schreiber (1998), were low on average for both forward 
associative strength (M = .06, SD = .08, range = .03-.10) and backward associative 
strength (M = .08, SD = .14, range = .03-.15). In addition, targets that were paired with 
the same response had weak backward and forward associations to each other (M = .02, 
SD = .06, range = .001-.07). 
 A schematic for the study phase is shown in Figure 1. The study list was divided 
into 4 seamless blocks with 72 word pairs in each block. One set of word pairs (24 in 
each block) repeated in all four blocks (A-B, A-B). Another set of word pairs (24 in each 
block; 96 total) were new in each block and had no relationship to any pairs from the 
previous blocks (C-D).  The last set of word pairs (24 in each block) repeated in the first 
three blocks and then had the same left-hand word paired with a different right-hand 
word in the fourth block (A-B, A-D). For example, the participant would see throat-tonsil 
in the first, second and third block and then see throat-tongue in the fourth block. Buffer 
items appeared at the beginning and end of the study phase, with 4 buffer items that 
represented each of the three item types (12 buffer items total). Word pairs appeared in a 
fixed random order in each block of the study phase, with the stipulation that no item 
type appeared more than three times consecutively. The average serial position for each 
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item type was also equated within each block to control for serial position effects on later 
recall performance.  
 Nine thought probes were inserted into each block of the study phase (36 total). 
The thought probes were pseudo-randomly placed to occur an equal number of times 
after each item type (three probes after each item type in each block). The probe screen 
appeared directly after the word pair disappeared. Probes were assigned to the same item 
type as the word pair that appeared directly before the probe. To reduce the systematicity 
of the probes, the interval at which the probes appeared was either 46, 54, 62, 70, or 78 
seconds (corresponding to 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 word pairs, respectively). The average duration 
between thought probes was 62 seconds (SD = 12.09). Each thought probe consisted of a 
discrete on-task or off-task judgment. 
 The test phase, which came immediately after the study phase, was self-paced and 
included cues from all 72 pairs that were presented in the fourth block. The cues appeared 
in a fixed random order for each format during the test phase, with the stipulation that 
cues representing the same item type did not appear more than three times consecutively 
and that serial position was relatively equal for all item types. 
 Participants completed the ARCES measure (Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008) 
on the computer. Each question from the paper and pencil version was converted to 
appear individually on the computer screen. All 12 statements appeared in the exact order 
as the paper and pencil version, and were given the same scaling options that ranged from 
1 (never) to 5 (very often).   
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Procedure 
 All participants were tested individually in rooms with a white noise machine 
running to reduce external distractions. Once consent was obtained, participants 
completed a computerized demographic questionnaire. All experimental stimuli were 
administered through E-prime software (Version 3, Psychology Software Tools, Inc) and 
appeared in white Arial size 24 font on a black background. Participants were asked to 
study a list of word pairs for an upcoming memory test. Word pairs appeared for 6 s each 
with a 2 s interstimulus interval (ISI) between each presentation. Participants were told 
that they would periodically be asked about their attention to the task, and were given an 
explanation about what was meant by “on-task” and “off-task” reports (see Appendix B 
for study instructions). On these thought probe trials, the probe screen appeared after the 
6 s study duration for the word pair (before the ISI). Participants were told to indicate if 
they were “On-task” or “Off-task” by using the mouse to click on the corresponding 
button. These responses were self-paced. After answering any questions that participants 
had, and monitoring the first few trials (the buffer items), the experimenter left the room 
to allow participants to experience natural variation in attention without the influence of 
the experimenter. 
 After completing the study phase, participants notified the experimenter, who 
returned and remained in the room for the test phase. To begin, the same six of the twelve 
buffer items were chosen for all participants to familiarize them with the test procedure. 
A cue appeared with a question mark (e.g., throat-?), and participants were asked to type 
in the response that the cue was paired with most recently (e.g., tongue). After entering 
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their response, a question appeared asking if the right word paired with the cue changed 
during the study phase. Participants were given the option to either press the “1” key to 
indicate that the word pair changed during the study phase, or to press the “0” key if the 
right word did not change during the study phase. If participants indicated change by 
pressing “1”, they were then asked to type in what the cue was paired with earlier in the 
study phase (e.g., tonsil). If participants indicated that the word pair did not change, they 
moved on to the next trial (see Appendix C for test instructions). Participants could guess 
or pass on trials when they could not remember a response. After the test, participants 
were administered the Revised Attention Related Cognitive Errors scale (Carriere et al., 
2008) computerized version that I programed. Finally, participants were debriefed, 
escorted out of the laboratory, and given partial course credit. The session lasted 
approximately 1.5 hours. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 All analyses were conducted using R software (R Core Team, 2019). Logistic 
mixed effects models were fit to the data using the glmer function from the lme4 package 
to account for random effects of subjects and items (Bates, Maechler & Dai, 2011). All 
models in the analyses below include subjects and items as random effects and 
experimental manipulations as fixed effects unless otherwise noted. Hypotheses were 
tested using the Anova function from the car package (Fox & Weisburg, 2011). Post hoc 
tests were done on the estimated marginal means produced by the emmeans package, 
which uses the Tukey method to control for the family wise error rate (Lenth, 2018). In 
addition, output from standard ANOVAs and t-tests along with partial eta squared and 
Cohen’s d values as estimates of effect size are included in Appendix D. All significant 
findings were based on α = .05. 
Study 
Attention to Task. To quantify the extent of attentional lapses during study, I 
calculated the proportion of “on-task” reports made by participants as a function of Block 
(1-4) and Item Type (Figure 2). I fit a model to the on-task proportion that included 
Block and Item Type as fixed effects. The model indicated a significant effect of Block, 
χ
2 (3) = 40.94, p < .001, no significant effect of Item Type, χ2 (2) = .83, p = .66, and a
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significant Item Type × Block interaction, χ2 (6) = 26.00, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that for A-B, A-B items, the on-task proportion did not differ between Block 1 
and the other 3 blocks, largest z ratio = 2.50, p = .06. The on-task proportion was higher 
in Block 2 than Blocks 3 and 4, smallest z ratio = 3.48, p = .003, and did not differ 
between Block 3 and 4, z ratio = 1.17, p =.64. For C-D items, the on-task proportion in 
Block 1 did not differ from Block 2, z ratio = .62, p = .93, but was significantly higher 
than in Blocks 3 and 4, smallest z ratio = 3.42, p = .004. The on-task proportion in Block 
2 was significantly higher than in Blocks 3 and 4, smallest z ratio = 2.80, p = .03. The on-
task proportion did not differ in Block 3 and Block 4, z ratio = .18, p = 1.00. For A-B, A-
D items, the on-task proportion was significantly higher in Block 1 than in Blocks 2 and 
3, smallest z ratio = 2.79, p = .03, but did not differ from the on-task proportion in Block 
4, z ratio = .53, p = .95. The on-task proportion in Block 2 did not differ from Blocks 3 
and 4, largest z ratio = 2.27, p = .11. Notably, the on-task proportion was significantly 
higher in Block 4 than in Block 3, z ratio = 3.53, p = .002. These results suggest that 
attention increased from the third to the fourth block for items that changed, but this 
effect was not shown for items that repeated or had never been studied before. I address 
the relationship between the on-task proportion and recall performance, which is the main 
interest of this study, in a later section. 
Test 
Recall Performance. Correct recall as a function of Item Type is displayed in 
Figure 3 (black points). To examine how recall performance varied as a function of Item 
Type, I fit a model to the correct recall data with a fixed effect of Item Type. As 
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expected, the model indicated a significant effect, χ2 (2) = 1167.60, p < .001. Post hoc 
analyses revealed that recall for A-B, A-B items was higher than for the other two item 
types, smallest z ratio = 28.81, p < .001. Recall for A-B, A-D items was also significantly 
higher than for C-D items, z ratio = 2.67, p = .02. Together these results show that 
memory was highest when there were spaced repetitions of study items and memory was 
poorest when an item was only seen once. In addition, proactive facilitation was observed 
in overall recall because recall for A-B, A-D items was higher than C-D items. 
Intrusions rates are displayed in Figure 4 (black points). Note that intrusions for 
A-B, A-B and C-D items represent baseline estimates of how often participants produced 
what the response would have been, presumably by guessing, had the item been in the A-
B, A-D condition. To examine intrusion rates as a function of Item Type, I fit a model 
with a fixed effect of Item Type. The model indicated a significant effect, χ2 (2) = 982.26, 
p < .001, showing that intrusions were the highest for A-B, A-D items compared to the 
other two item types, smallest z ratio = 23.18, but did not differ between A-B, A-B and 
C-D items, z ratio = .11, p = .99. These results show that participants experienced 
proactive interference on A-B, A-D items, in the form of intrusions. 
Change Classification. The change classification rates at test as a function of 
Item Type are shown in Table 1. I fit a model to the change classification data that 
included a fixed effect of Item Type. The model indicated a significant effect, χ2 (2) = 
1379.40, p < .001, with the highest change classifications rates for A-B, A-D items 
compared to the other two item types, smallest z ratio = 29.06, p < .001. Change 
classifications were also higher for A-B, A-B items than for C-D items, z ratio = 2.73, p = 
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.02. These findings suggest that participants could identify a reasonable proportion of 
changed items as such. Since I was most interested in change classifications made for A-
B, A-D items, I also calculated the joint probabilities of the three possible outcomes for 
change classifications at test for those items: classifying an item as changed and correctly 
reporting the earlier response (change recollection), classifying an item as changed 
without correct recall of the earlier response, and not identifying an item as changed. As 
shown in Table 2, participants were able to report the earlier pairing some, not but all of 
the time after they indicated change. 
Recall Performance Conditionalized on Change Classification. To examine 
the association between change recollection and later recall performance, I used the 
change classifications outlined above to conditionalize correct recall for A-B, A-D items 
(Figure 3, colored points). The model fit to the conditionalized recall data included a 
fixed effect of Change Classification (including the three levels listed above) along with 
recall performance on C-D items so that proactive effects of memory could be examined. 
The model indicated a significant effect of Change Classification, χ2 (3) = 669.37, p < 
.001. Recall performance was significantly higher when participants recollected change 
than when they did not, smallest z ratio = 15.62, p < .001, but did not differ between 
change classifications made without recall of the earlier response and no change 
classification, z ratio = 2.01, p = .18. Regarding proactive effects of memory, participants 
experienced proactive facilitation when change was recollected, as recall for A-B, A-D 
items was higher than recall for C-D items, z ratio = 20.42, p < .001. When participants 
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did not recollect change, proactive interference occurred, where recall for A-B, A-D 
items was lower than recall for C-D items, smallest z ratio = 4.65, p < .001. 
I also fit a model to intrusion data that were conditionalized based on whether 
change was indicated or not (Figure 4, colored points). I did not conditionalize intrusions 
based on change classification along with correct recall of the earlier response because 
making that response would negate producing it as an intrusion. The model indicated a 
significant effect of Change Classification, χ2 (1) = 126.15, p <.001, with higher intrusion 
rates when change was not indicated compared to when it was, z ratio = 11.32, p < .001. 
Relationship between Study and Test 
Between-Subjects Correlations between Recall Performance and Proportion 
On-Task. Given that participants were tested on responses that were presented in Block 
4, I limited the correlations I performed to the proportion of “on-task” reports given in 
Block 4. This allowed for the most direct link between attention to the task and memory 
performance on the final test. I conducted Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients for the on-task proportion in Block 4 and the associated correct recall on the 
test separately for each item type (Figure 5). For all three item types, there were 
significant positive correlations, such that recall performance increased as the on-task 
proportion increased (A-B, A-B: r(130) = .34, p < .001; C-D: r(130) = .41, p < .001; A-B, 
A-D: r(130) = .45, p < .001). As shown in Figure 6, the correlation between the on-task 
proportion in Block 4 and intrusion rates for A-B, A-D items was not significant, r(130) 
= -.12, p = .16. Finally, as shown in Figure 7, there was a significant positive correlation 
between the on-task proportion in Block 4 and change recollection for the A-B, A-D 
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items, r(130) = .38, p < .001. Together these results show that participants who were on-
task more often had higher correct recall and higher rates of change recollection 
compared to those who were off-task more often. 
As an exploratory measure, I also conducted a correlation between the on-task 
proportion across the experiment (collapsing across blocks) and recall performance on 
the C-D items (Figure 8). Although the on-task proportion for Blocks 1-3 does not align 
with items that participants were tested on, this could reveal how attention to the task in 
general was related to recall performance. There was a significant positive correlation, 
r(130) = .50, p < .001, showing that as the on-task proportion increased, recall 
performance for C-D items increased. 
Recall Performance Conditionalized on Task Reports. In addition to 
examining the relationship between attention during study and later memory performance 
between subjects, I also examined this relationship within subjects. If attention is 
necessary for recall performance, then participants should perform worse when they 
make an “off-task” report than when they make an “on-task” report. This may be 
especially true for A-B, A-D items because attention would be required to encode 
changes. To test this, I conditionalized correct recall for each Item Type on whether 
participants gave an “on-task” or “off-task” reports during Block 4 (Figure 9). Consistent 
with the previous analyses, I limited this comparison to task reports made in Block 4 only 
since participants were tested on Block 4 items (and this is where the change for A-B, A-
D items occurred). To be included in this analysis, participants must have had at least one 
“on-task” report and one “off-task” report in Block 4. Restricting the analysis in this way 
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resulted in an unequal number of participants included in the comparisons across each of 
the Item Types, but the same participants being compared across on and off-task 
responses within each Item Type.  
I fit a model to the recall data that included fixed effects of Item Type and Task 
Report. I do not report results that are redundant with those reported before. The model 
indicated a significant effect of Task Report, χ2 (1) = 10.26, p = .001, showing that 
participants had higher recall when giving “on-task” compared to “off-task” reports. 
Although the interaction between Item Type and Task Report was not significant, χ2 (2) = 
2.77, p = .25, I examined the post hoc analyses for this interaction because it was the 
main interest for the current study. Post hoc analyses showed that the difference between 
recall performance when participants were on or off-task for A-B, A-B items was not 
significant, z ratio = .69, p = .49, but that this difference was significant for both C-D 
items, z ratio = 2.58, p = .001, and A-B, A-D items, z ratio = 2.44, p = .01. Although 
inconclusive, the pattern of results does suggest that attention during encoding in Block 4 
influenced recall performance for changed and new items, but not for repeated items. 
For the A-B, A-D items, I also conditionalized intrusions (Figure 10) and change 
recollection rates (Figure 11) based on whether participants made “on-task” or “off-task” 
reports for probes following A-B, A-D items in Block 4. I fit separate but comparable 
models for conditionalized intrusions and change recollection rates that included a fixed 
effect of Task Report. The model fit to intrusions indicated no significant effect of Task 
Report, χ2(1) = .20, p = .65, showing that intrusion rates did not differ between “on-task” 
and “off-task” reports. The model for change recollection rates indicated a significant 
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effect of Task Report,  χ2(1) = 5.98, p = .01, showing that participants were more likely to 
recollect change when they reported being “on-task” compared to “off-task”. 
ARCES 
Between-Subjects Correlations between ARCES and Proportion On-Task. 
To examine the relationship between attention to the task and how often participants may 
experience everyday attention errors, I examined the correlation between the score on the 
ARCES measure and the proportion of on-task reports. Note that this measure is 
potentially contaminated given that it was administered once participants had already 
made on and off-task judgements during the study phase. I calculated an item mean for 
each participant (Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006). As discussed in the Introduction, 
possible scores ranged from 1-5 on the measure, with higher scores indicating a greater 
likelihood of experiencing everyday cognitive failures related to attention. The average 
score on the measure across all participants was M = 3.33, CI = [3.28, 3.38]. The 
correlation between the ARCES score and the proportion on-task was not significant, 
r(130) = -.02, p = .79 (Figure 12). There was no evidence for a relationship between the 
propensity to experience errors in everyday life due to lack of attention and the attention 
given during encoding in the current task.
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 The present experiment examined the consequences of natural fluctuations in 
attention on memory under conditions that could lead to proactive interference. Results 
showed that, in general, attention decreased as the study phase continued. However, this 
pattern was different for A-B, A-D items: there was an increase in the self-reported 
attentional engagement from the third to the fourth (and last) block of the study phase, 
which is when the changes appeared. This increase did not occur for A-B, A-B or C-D 
items. The results from the cued recall test showed that proactive facilitation was 
observed in overall recall, suggesting that participants were able to detect and recollect 
changes often enough to drive up performance. Recall for A-B, A-D items was higher 
when change was recollected than when it was not. Furthermore, the conditionalized 
recall data showed proactive facilitation when change was recollected, and proactive 
interference when change was not recollected. In addition, conditionalized intrusion rates 
were lower change was remembered than when it was not. 
Critically, there were relationships between attention during the study phase and 
later recall, both between and within participants. There were significant positive 
between subject correlations between the on-task proportion during study and subsequent 
recall. Furthermore, within subjects, conditionalized recall performance was significantly
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 higher when an “on-task” report was made compared to when an “off-task” report was 
made. For A-B, A-D items, change recollection rates were significantly higher when an 
“on-task” report was made compared to when an “off-task” report was made. The 
theoretical implications of these findings for the MFC account and the ways in which the 
results situate with prior mind wandering work is discussed below. 
Attentional Fluctuation and Memory for Changes 
The findings from this experiment add to the growing body of literature in support 
of the MFC account. As described in the Introduction, the account proposes that overall 
recall performance on A-B, A-D items in a paired associate learning paradigm is 
comprised of both facilitation and interference effects. When change is detected and 
recollected, then proactive facilitation is observed. In contrast, if change is detected and 
not recollected, then proactive interference is observed. Although the current study did 
not directly measure change detection in List 2, the results from this study are consistent 
with the MFC account in showing that participants experienced proactive facilitation 
when change was recollected and proactive interference when change was not 
recollected. 
The novel contribution of this study was to examine the role that attention plays in 
detecting and recollecting change. By manipulating instructions on where to look for 
changes, Jacoby et al. (2015) showed that attention can be directed towards changes. The 
current study is the first to build on this idea and empirically examine the influence of 
natural variations in attention over the course of a study phase on later change processing. 
Based on the finding that mind wandering disrupts elaborative encoding and leads to 
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poorer memory performance (e.g., Thomson et al., 2014), I expected that being off-task 
would be negatively associated with participants’ ability to recollect change, which 
would be associated with poorer memory accuracy on the cued recall test. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, the results showed that when participants indicated being “off-task” 
in the last block, they had lower change recollection rates and lower correct recall for A-
B, A-D items compared to when they indicated being “on-task”. It was also found that 
across participants, those who paid more attention, as indicated by more “on-task” reports 
during the last block of the study phase showed higher correct recall for A-B, A-D items 
than participants who paid less attention, as indicated by more “off-task” reports. Part of 
the benefit to correct recall may have been driven by higher change recollection rates, as 
it was found that participants who were on-task more often in the last block recollected 
change more often than those who were off-task more often. This suggests that attention 
is a necessary component for detection and later recollection of changes. 
Given the evidence for the role of attention in change processing from the current 
study, the MFC account may need to be refined to further articulate a role for natural 
variations in attention during encoding (which can stimulate study-phase retrievals). As 
discussed in the Introduction, the subjective experience of encoding a changed word pair 
is akin to taking a recognition memory test or to categorizing an object based on both 
shared and distinctive features. One must decipher if the current pair being studied is the 
same as the one seen before, or if it includes both shared and changed features. Since 
change detection and recollection begins with the initial reminding that allows for the 
responses to become integrated, attention must be given to the changed response to allow 
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this reminding to occur. Attention during encoding is critical for the memorial benefits 
associated with change recollection, as previous research has shown that without the 
initial reminding that leads to change detection, there is no further memorial benefit 
associated with change recollection (Wahlheim & Zacks, 2019). Therefore, further work 
examining the MFC account should incorporate how natural variation in attention 
contributes to the initial reminding process. This could be used as one tool to better 
predict whether one may experience proactive interference when response competition is 
present. 
It was also hypothesized that being off-task during encoding when under 
conditions that could lead to proactive interference would increase the rate of intrusions 
on the final test, as disruptions to encoding the changed pair could allow the original pair 
to become a strong competitor. Instead, the results showed that there was no significant 
correlation between the on-task proportion and the intrusion rates, and intrusion rates did 
not differ based on whether an “on-task” or “off-task” report had been made. This 
relationship could depend on how attention was allocated throughout the previous three 
blocks. The current study included thought probes inserted pseudo-randomly throughout 
the blocks in order to capture attention lapses more naturally, but this meant that there 
was not a direct match for probes to appear after the same items in each block. 
Consequently, the data reported here does not allow me to draw conclusions about the 
attention allocation during the study on specific items. Despite this limitation, one can 
imagine that if participants give attention to an A-B item but not the associated A-D item, 
intrusions rate may increase. In order to more accurately capture this relationship, future 
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research should consider comparing attention for both the A-B item and the associated A-
D item in the study phase and then examining the downstream consequences for later 
memory. 
The focus of the current study was on the role of attention under conditions that 
could lead to interference, with the hypothesis that the difference between performance 
when one is on or off-task should be the largest for changed information (A-B, A-D 
items). Although inconclusive, there was evidence in the pairwise comparisons for recall 
data conditionalized on probe reports in Block 4 to suggest that attention during study 
was related to recall performance for both C-D and A-B, A-D items, but not for A-B, A-
B items. This pattern suggests that future research should design studies that can examine 
this relationship in a more powerful way. One technique would be to remove the C-D 
items from the study and test phase and only use A-B, A-B and A-B, A-D items. This 
would increase the number of observations for each item type and increase the power to 
examine such interactions. In addition, as mentioned above, it will be important for future 
studies to map thought probes onto the same items across blocks. By having probes that 
appear consistently for the same items across blocks, one may be able to better estimate if 
the consequences for attention on later recall differ as a function of the item type. 
It is also important to point out that there was evidence from the between subject 
correlations showing that attention during encoding was important for memory for all 
item types, not just for changed items. Conceptually, being engaged in an off-task 
thought is like a divided attention-task where one is splitting attention between the 
external task demands and their own internal thoughts. Therefore, the relationship 
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between attention during encoding and overall memory performance is not surprising 
given the large body of literature on the detrimental effects on memory when attention is 
divided (e.g., Anderson, Craik & Naveh-Benjamin, 1998; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-
Benjamin & Anderson, 1996; Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000). In tasks used to study 
divided attention, participants are usually required to study a list of words and 
concurrently perform a secondary task, such as a continuous reaction-tasks that requires 
participants to quickly discriminate between sounds or to find a target in a visual  array. 
Results from these studies show that memory performance is hindered when attention is 
divided during encoding compared to when attention is not divided. This is consistent 
with the results reported here showing that recall performance was lower when 
participants were paying attention to something else other than studying the word pair 
compared to when they indicated paying attention to the word pair. 
Relationship to Mind Wandering Literature 
In the current experiment, I utilized thought probes as a tool to measure 
attentional fluctuation during study. By doing so, the present findings can further 
contribute to the small body of literature examining the consequences of mind wandering 
on memory performance in paradigms testing basic memory processes. Previous work 
has found that the type of processing that participants are engaged in can influence how 
likely they are to pay attention. When participants are asked to engage in a task that 
requires rating how pleasant they feel a word is (Maillet & Rajah, 2013), or if the word is 
too easy or too difficult for them to study (Xu & Metcalfe, 2016), they are more likely to 
mind wander. Furthermore, when the task requires them to engage more elaborately with 
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the word by imaging its size relative to a computer monitor, participants more often let 
their thoughts drift away (Thomson et al., 2014). In addition to these factors, the results 
from the current study suggest that the A-B, A-D items acted as a cue for participants to 
pay attention because there was an increase in attention from the third to the fourth block 
of the study phase for A-B, A-D items only. This finding cannot be explained by a 
novelty effect because this increase in on-task reports was not shown for C-D items, 
which were also novel to the last block. 
This finding of increased attention to changes is somewhat consistent with other 
work suggesting that situational changes can reduce mind wandering. Specifically, Faber, 
Radvansky and D’Mello (2018) examined the number of self-caught mind wandering 
episodes while participants watched a narrative film that included a range of changes, 
such as different locations or characters being shown. The results showed that more 
situational changes in the narrative and a higher likelihood of an event boundary 
occurring were associated with less mind wandering. The authors argue that when there 
was a change in the narrative, it kept people focused on the film rather than on their own 
internal thoughts. Although the level of change in the current experiment could have been 
more subtle given that it was word pairs instead of dynamic stimuli, this may be one 
reason why the rate of on-task reports increased for the A-B, A-D items from the third to 
the fourth block. 
Another possibility is that retrieving the earlier response when encoding the 
changed response (which was assumed to occur during change detection) acted as a type 
of test for participants. We know that the benefits of interleaving testing during study can 
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reduce the rates of mind wandering (Szpunar, Khan, & Schacter, 2013). In their study, 
Szpunar et al. (2013) had participants study lecture notes in the laboratory and then had to 
report how often they mind wandered after the lecture (Experiment 1) or were probed if 
they were mind wandering during the lecture (Experiment 2). The results across both 
experiments showed that the interpolated testing group showed lower mind wandering 
rates than the group that had not been tested throughout the lecture segments. According 
to the MFC account, the presentation of the A-D pair can stimulate spontaneous retrieval 
of the A-B pair, so the presentation of A-D pairs in the current study could have kept 
participants more focused on encoding those items compared to other items that did not 
require such retrieval processes. It could be argued that the presentation of a repeated A-
B pairs may also stimulate the retrieval of earlier A-B pairs (Wahlheim, Maddox, & 
Jacoby, 2014), but this retrieval process would likely be different. The retrievals that are 
triggered by the presentation of A-D pairs may be more indicative of elaborative 
processing that requires more focus because it is posited that participants are integrating 
both responses into a configural representation along with the reminding that bound the 
responses together (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2015; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). 
Finally, the results of the current study inform the utility of the ARCES measure, 
which was used here in an exploratory manner to examine the relationship between 
attention to the task during encoding and the propensity to experience errors related to 
lapses in attention. Prior work has found that the ARCES measure was highly correlated 
with other measures of the propensity to have attentional lapses and on errors in a SART 
task (Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006; Carriere et al., 2008). However, there has not 
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been research examining how the ARCES score relates to performance on other cognitive 
tasks. The lack of correlation found here suggests that it does not correlate with the lapses 
of attention that occur during an episodic memory task. The design of the task used in the 
current experiment differs significantly from sustained attention measures, and so it may 
be the utility of the ARCES measure is limited to sustained attention-tasks where an error 
score can be calculated continuously throughout the task, rather than an paired associate 
learning task where the “errors” do not appear until the final recall test is taken. 
Limitations of the Present Experiment 
Although the results of the current study support the relationship between 
attention and the ability to recollect changes, there are several limitations that should be 
acknowledged. As with earlier studies relying on self-reported mind wandering episodes, 
it is unknown how accurate the measurement of attentional fluctuation was. Furthermore, 
it is possible that variations in the experimental design could influence the results. For 
example, the probe design used in the current study, which asked participants to indicate 
if they were on or off-task, deviates from other mind wandering work that uses several 
categorized thought options (e.g., Kane et al., 2007; Kane et al., 2017) or explicitly gives 
participants the option to indicate that they are “mind wandering” (e.g., Metcalfe & Xu, 
2016; Xu & Metcalfe, 2016). It is unknown exactly how the wording of the probes may 
impact the proportion of “on-task” reports in the current experiment, but previous work 
has suggested that mind wandering rates can vary as a function of probe framing (e.g., 
Weinstein, De Lima, & van der Zee, 2018). Furthermore, due to the constraints of the 
study design, probes appeared for participants 62 seconds apart on average. This could 
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also impact the proportion of “on-task” reports because prior work found that mind 
wandering rates increase as the time between probes increases (Seli, Carriere, Levene, & 
Smilek, 2013). Given these limitations, it is important for future work to examine if the 
relationship between attention and change processing remains when the framing and 
timing of the probes is altered. 
Concluding Remarks 
In sum, the current experiment is the first to attempt a direct examination of the 
role that natural fluctuation in attention has in change processing. Results showed that 
recall performance both between and within participants was significantly higher when 
participants were “on-task” compared to “off-task”. This suggests that attention does 
impact how often one will engage in change detection and recollection, and that there are 
consequences for fluctuations in attention on later recall. By testing the assumption from 
the MFC account that attention is involved in these processes, this experiment further 
refined the account by identifying attention as one endogenous factor that influences 
change detection and recollection. Future work should continue to examine how 
combinations of attention on both the original and change information can influence the 
processes posited by the MFC account, and should utilize a variety of methods to further 
test the boundaries of the findings reported here. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1  
Probability of Change Classifications as a Function of Item Type 
   
 Item Type  
   
A-B, A-B C-D A-B, A-D 
.06 [.05, .07] .05 [.04, .06] .39 [.37, .41] 
Note. Bootstrap 95% confidence intervals are displayed in brackets.
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Table 2   
Probability of Change Classification for A-B, A-D Items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Bootstrap 95% confidence intervals are displayed in brackets
   
 Change Classification  
   
Changed + Recall 
Earlier Response 
Changed + No Recall 
Earlier Response 
Not Changed 
   
.28 [.26, .30] .12 [.11, .13] .61 [.59, .63] 
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Figure 1. Experimental Design. Participants studied a list that contained four seamless 
blocks. Each block contained word pairs that repeated across each block (A-B, A-B), 
repeated in the first three blocks and then had the same cue with a changed response in 
the fourth block (A-B, A-D), or were new to each block (C-D). Thought probes were 
dispersed pseudo-randomly such that three probes came after each item type in each 
block, and the probes were varied to appear 6-10 word pairs apart from each other. The 
probe appeared immediately after the previous word pair, and asked participants to 
indicate if they were On-task or Off-task. After making their indication, participants 
studied the next pair. Participants were tested on all pairs presented in Block 4. 
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Figure 2. Proportion On-Task as a Function of Item Type and Block. Error bars are 
bootstrap 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 3. Correct Recall as a Function of Item Type. Black points represent overall 
correct recall for each item type. The green dot represents conditionalized correct recall 
for A-B, A-D items given that participants indicated change and were able to recall the 
earlier response (change recollection). The blue point represents conditionalized correct 
recall for A-B, A-D items given that participants indicated change and did not correctly 
recall the earlier response. The red point indicates conditionalized correct recall for A-B, 
A-D items given that participants did not indicate change. The size of the colored dots 
represents the proportion of all responses that fall into each of those cells. Error bars are 
bootstrap 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4. Intrusions as a Function of Item Type. The black points represent the intrusion 
rates for each item type. The green dot represents the conditionalized intrusion rate given 
that participants indicated that the word pair changed. The red dot represents the 
conditionalized intrusion rate given that participants did not indicate that the word pair 
changed. The size of the dot represents the proportion of responses that fall into each of 
those cells. Error bars are bootstrap 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 5. Between-Subjects Correlations Between Block 4 Proportion On-Task and 
Correct Recall. Given that the on-task proportion is from block 4 only, the on-task 
proportion was calculated based on 3 probes per participant for each item type. Shaded 
region shows the 95% confidence interval. The correlation coefficient and degrees of 
freedom are shown in the upper left-hand corner of each panel. 
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Figure 6. Between-Subjects Correlations Between Block 4 Proportion On-Task and 
Intrusions for A-B, A-D Items. Given that the on-task proportion is from block 4 only, 
the proportion on-task was calculated based on 3 probes per participant. Shaded region 
shows the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 7. Between-Subjects Correlations Between Block 4 Proportion On-Task and 
Change Recollection for A-B, A-D Items. Given that the on-task proportion is from block 
4 only, the proportion on-task was calculated based on 3 probes per participant. Shaded 
region shows the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 8. Between-Subjects Correlations Between Proportion On-Task During Study and 
Correct Recall for C-D Items. The proportion on-task was calculated based on all 36 
probes. Shaded region shows the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 9. Probability of Correct Recall as a Function of Probe Reports in Block 4. The 
number of participants that contributed to each on and off-task comparison are labeled 
above the set of bars for each item type. Error bars are bootstrap 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 10. Probability of Intrusions as a Function of Probe Reports in Block 4 for A-B, 
A-D Items. The number of participants that contributed to the on and off-task comparison 
is listed above the bars. Error bars are bootstrap 95% confidence intervals.  
59 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Probability of Change Recollection as a Function of Probe Reports in Block 4 
for A-B, A-D Items. The number of participants that contributed to the on and off-task 
comparison is listed above the bars. Error bars are bootstrap 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 12. Between-Subjects Correlations Between ARCES and Proportion On-Task 
During Study. Shaded region shows the 95% confidence interval.  
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APPENDIX B 
STUDY PHASE INSTRUCTIONS 
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to study word pairs for an upcoming test.  
Some of the word pairs will repeat, some will appear once, and some will change at a 
later point in the study phase.  For changed word pairs, the left-hand member of a pair 
will be presented later with a different right-hand member (e.g., silly-clown; silly-giggle).  
Each pair will appear on the screen for 6 seconds.   Please learn each pair as best as you 
can for a test that you will be given at the end of the experiment. 
Do you have any questions? 
Press the SPACE BAR for more instructions. 
While you are studying the word pairs, you may notice that your ability to focus your 
attention on the task waxes and wanes throughout this period.  It is normal for people to 
experience various levels of attentional engagement.  We are interested in the extent to 
which you experience these variations in task engagement.  Every now and then, we will 
ask you to indicate your current level of engagement during the upcoming study phase.  
To measure this, we will randomly present a screen that asks you to indicate whether you 
are on-task or off-task.  If your attention just before the probe was firmly directed at 
learning the word pairs, then indicate that you are On-task.  In contrast, if your attention 
was on something else other than studying the word pairs, then indicate that you are Off-
task.  You will indicate this by clicking the appropriately labeled button on the screen. 
Do you have any questions? 
Press the SPACE BAR when you are ready to begin studying. 
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APPENDIX C 
TEST PHASE INSTRUCTIONS 
Test Phase 
In this part of the experiment, you will be tested on your memory for the word pairs that 
you studied.  You will be presented with the left member of a word pair (e.g., silly - ?), 
and your task will be to type the word that it was most recently paired with during the 
study phase. 
Do you have any questions? 
Press the SPACE BAR for more instructions. 
After you have made your response, you will be asked whether the right word changed 
during the study phase.  The question, “Did the right word change during the study 
phase?” will appear in the middle of the screen with boxes labeled “Yes (1)” and “No 
(0)” displayed below.   
If you think that the right word that was presented with the left-hand member of a pair 
changed in the study phase (e.g., silly-clown; silly-giggle), then press the "1" on the 
keyboard.  When you indicate that a pair has changed (silly-giggle), you will next be 
asked to recall what the cue was paired with earlier in the study phase (clown).  If you 
cannot remember the earlier pairing, then it is fine to either guess or pass.  Please type 
your response into the box below and check your spelling carefully.  In contrast, if you do 
not think that the right word of a pair changed during the study phase, then you should 
press the “0” on the keyboard. 
Do you have any questions? 
Press the SPACE BAR to start with some practice trials. 
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APPENDIX D 
ANOVAS AND EFFECT SIZES 
Attention to task. A two-way ANOVA was performed to compare the effects of 
Item Type and Block on the proportion of on-task reports. There was a significant effect 
of Block, F(3, 4740) = 6.43, p < .001, ɳp
2 = .004, which was qualified by a significant 
Block × Item Type interaction, F(6,4740) = 4.00, p < .001, ɳp
2 = .005. As shown in 
Figure 2, the proportion of on-task thoughts increased from Block 3 to Block 4 for A-B, 
A-D items but was not significantly different for A-B, A-B or C-D items. The effect of 
Item Type was not significant, F(2, 4740) = .94, p = .39, ɳp
2 < .001. 
Recall performance. A one-way ANOVA was performed to compare the effects 
of Item Type on recall performance. The effect of Item Type was significant, F(2, 9501) 
= 582.79, p < .001, ɳp
2 = .11. As can be seen in Figure 3 (right panel), recall for A-B, A-B 
items was significantly higher than the other two item types, but recall did not differ 
between A-B, A-D and C-D items. A separate one-way ANOVA was performed to 
compare the effects of Item Type on intrusion rates. The effect of Item Type was 
significant, F(2, 9501) = 1051.18, p < .001, ɳp
2 = .18. As shown in Figure 3 (right panel), 
intrusions were highest for A-B, A-D items, but did not differ between A-B, A-B and C-
D items. 
Change classifications. A one-way ANOVA was performed to compare the 
effects of Item Type on change classifications made during on the cued recall test. There 
was a significant effect of Item Type, F(2, 9501) = 1048.1, p < .001, ɳp
2 = .18. As shown 
in Table 1, change classifications were highest for the A-B, A-D items, and change 
classifications did not differ between A-B, A-B and C-D items. 
Recall performance conditionalized on change classifications. A one-way 
ANOVA was performed to compare the effects of the three levels of change 
classification outcomes at test on conditionalized correct recall. The levels include 
indicating change and reporting the earlier response (change recollection), indicating 
change without reporting the earlier response, and not indicating change. Recall 
performance on the C-D items was also included as a level in the ANOVA so that 
proactive effects of memory could be examined. There was a significant effect of Change 
Classification, F(2, 9501) = 582.79, p < .001, ɳp
2 = .25. As shown in Figure 3 (left panel), 
recall performance was higher when participants recollected change compared to when 
they did not recollect change. 
To compare the effect of change classifications on the rate of intrusions, a t-test 
was conducted that included whether participants indicated change at test or not. There 
was not a level to include indicating change and reporting the earlier response because 
doing so would negate producing it as an intrusion. The pairwise comparison showed that 
intrusions were significantly lower when participants indicated that there was a change at 
test compared to when they did not indicate change, t(3061) = 13.56, p < .001, d = .48. 
Recall performance conditionalized on attention to task. Since there were an 
unequal number of participants that contributed to recall performance for each Item Type 
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based on the task reports made in Block 4, I fit separate one-way ANOVAs to each Item 
Type to examine the effects of Task Report on correct recall. The ANOVA for A-B, A-B 
items showed no significant effect of Task Report, F(1, 110) = .01, p = .92, ɳp
2 < .001. 
The ANOVA for C-D items showed a significant effect of Task Report, F(1, 152) = 5.47, 
p = .02, ɳp
2 = .03. The ANOVA for A-B, A-D items also showed a significant effect of 
Task Report, F(1, 114) = 5.52, p = .02, ɳp
2 = .05. 
